We study practically relevant aspects of popularity in two-sided matching where only one side has preferences. A matching is called popular if there does not exist another matching that is preferred by a simple majority. We show that for a matching to be popular it is necessary and su cient that no coalition of size up to 3 decides by simple majority to exchange their houses. We then show that a market where such coalitions meet at random converges to a popular matching whenever it exists.
INTRODUCTION
Various real-life economic situations can be modeled as two-sided matching markets where agents have preferences over indivisible objects and such that each agent gets at most one object, also known as the house allocation problem.
ese situations include housing markets, assigning students to primary schools, donor organ exchange programs, job placement and graduates, and so forth.
Among di erent notions of e ciency for these matching markets, recent literature highlights the concept of popularity. A matching is called popular if majority of agents weakly prefers it over any other matching. 1 Popularity has mainly served as a normative property as it is a natural non-Paretian selection from a (possibly very large) set of e cient matchings.
e seminal paper by [Abraham et al., 2007] that introduced popularity for the house allocation problem proposed a simple characterization of popular matchings. A matching is popular if and only if (1) each agent gets either his best house among all houses (called his rst house), or the best house among all houses that are not someone's best (called his second house), and (2) all rst houses are allocated among agents that deem them as the best.
e subsequent literature (see [Cseh, 2017 , Klaus et al., 2016 and the subsection below) focused mainly on issues relevant for centralized markets. In contrast to that, in the current paper we shi the focus from popularity in centralized markets to decentralized markets.
Our rst result ( eorem 3.1) shows that a popular matching only needs to be popular locally: the matching is popular if and only if no group of up to three agents decides (by simple majority) to exchange their houses, keeping the matching of other agents untouched. 2 e original characterization in [Abraham et al., 2007] directly follows from our result (Corollary 3.2).
Our paper also suggests a positive rationale behind popularity: we show that locally popular improvements lead to globally popular matchings and thus popularity is likely to be eventually observed in realistic situations. Speci cally, we consider a decentralized market where agents at random meet in groups of size up to three and exchange their houses when this is supported by majority of them. Our second result ( eorem 4.1) shows that this market eventually converges to a popular matching whenever it exists.
Our nding is analogous to the result in [Roth and Vate, 1990 ] about convergence in a marriage market. ere, one matching is modi ed locally by a blocking pair of a man and woman that prefer 1 One can also see popular matchings as weak Condorcet winners in a voting problem where candidates are all possible matchings. 2 is result can also be interpreted from the cooperative standpoint. If for each coalition we take the majority rule as the solution concept, then for a matching to be in the core it is enough to check coalitions of size up to three. e analogous result for the marriage market states that the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the core [Roth and Sotomayor, 1992] each other over their current matches. As this man and this woman match, their previous partners become unmatched, and these changes constitute a new matching. en a new blocking pair is considered, a new matching is formed, and so forth. [Roth and Vate, 1990] show that the sequence of these matchings lead to a stable matching.
In our case blocking takes a slightly di erent form: each time the group of agents exchanges their houses within themselves. is strengthens the analogy with the real estate market where agents exchange their houses within small groups and no agent leaves without a house. 3 Another closely related paper is [Abraham and Kavitha, 2010] that considers the popularityimprovement paths from an arbitrary matching. e main nding is that, given a popular matching exists, it can be a ained by at most two steps using an e cient algorithm. However, a realistic application of these exchanges even in a centralized market faces two di culties. First, for exchanges that large one might need much data about agent's preferences, and this data might be di cult to obtain. 4 Second, large exchanges are very risky and unstable as everything depends on each person agreeing to be part of the deal.
Background
e assignment game where agents exchange indivisible objects (houses) without money was rst introduced in [Shapley and Scarf, 1974] , the assignment problem where all houses are social endowments was rst studied in [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979] . e concept of popularity was rst introduced by [Gärdenfors, 1975] for the two-sided matching problem [Gale and Shapley, 1962] , where popularity coincides with stability, and was applied to two-sided matching problem only recently by [Abraham et al., 2007] . In their paper [Abraham et al., 2007] characterized the set of popular matchings as matchings where each agent gets either his rst house or his second house and proposed an e cient algorithm to nd a popular matching. 5 Existence and multiplicity of popular matchings was studied from several sides. First, [Mahdian, 2006] shows that a popular matching is likely to exist whenever preferences are uniformly random and the number of houses is approximately 1.42 times larger than the number of agents. For se ings where a popular matching does not exist, [Kavitha, 2014] studied how to minimally augment the preference pro le so that the existence is guaranteed; this problem is, in general, NP-hard.
Another way to ensure popularity is to consider mixed matchings, i.e. lo eries over matchings, and a straightforward generalization of the popularity property; [Kavitha et al., 2011] show that a popular mixed matching always exists and propose an e cient algorithm to nd one.
As an alternative approach, [McCutchen, 2008] proposes least-unpopularity criteria to nd the "most" popular matching; nding his least-unpopular matchings is, in general, NP-hard.
e problem of counting the number of popular matchings has been addressed in [McDermid and Irving, 2011] for the case of strict preferences and in [Nasre, 2014] and [Acharyya et al., 2014] for the case of weak preferences. 3 For instance, according to [RosBusinessConsulting, 2017] , in 2017 the secondary housing market in the largest European city, Moscow, the share of alternative deals, i.e. not house-for-money but house-for-house, was approximately 90%. 4 According to [Yuan, 1996] , in 1990 subsidized housing markets in Beijing where residents exchange their houses had size of 80 000. 5 e result in [Abraham et al., 2007] also allows ties. is se ing was further generalized to the case with ties and matroid constraints by [Kamiyama, 2017] and to the case with two-sided preferences and one-sided ties by (the la er problem turns out to be NP-hard). e many-to-one matching problem, where each house has a capacity was studied in [Sng and Manlove, 2010] , and the many-to-many problem was studied by [Paluch, 2014] .
THE MODEL
Let A be a set of agents and H be a (larger) set of houses, |H | ≥ |A|. Each agent a ∈ A is endowed with a strict preference relation a over the set of houses H ∪ {∅} (i.e. a is a linear order), and a prefers each house h ∈ H over having no house, h a ∅. e collection of individual preferences of all agents = ( a ) a ∈A is referred to as the preference pro le. e triple (A, H, ) constitutes the two-sided matching problem (aka house allocation problem), or simply a problem. In what follows we assume that the sets A and H are xed and the problem is given by the preference pro le .
A solution to the problem is a matching µ -a mapping from A ∪ H ∪ ∅ on itself: by de nition agent a ∈ A is said to be matched to a house h ∈ H in matching µ if µ(a) = h and also µ(h) = a. If some agent or house remain unmatched, we say that they are matched to ∅. Let M denote the set of all possible matchings.
For any two matchings µ, µ ∈ M and a subset of agents B ⊂ A de ne pairwise comparison PC B (µ, µ ) as the number of agents in B that strictly prefer their house in µ over their house in µ .
A matching µ ∈ M is called popular (among set A) if there does not exist another matching µ ∈ M such that µ is preferred over µ by simple majority within entire set of agents A:
For each agent a let us call his most preferred house in H as a's rst house: F H (a) = h such that for each h ∈ H and h h it holds that h a h . e set of all rst houses is denoted as
For each house h let us call agents for whom h is the rst house as h's rst agents:
For each agent a let us call his most preferred house among all non-rst houses as a's second house: SH (a) = h such that for each h ∈ H \ F H (A) and h h it holds that h a h . e set of all second houses is denoted as SH (A) = {SH (a)} a ∈A . For each house h let us call agents for whom h is the second house as h's second agents: SA(h) = {a ∈ A|h = SH (a)}.
Note that sets F H (A) and SH (A) are disjoint, i.e. no agent's second house can be a rst house for any other agent.
CHARACTERIZATION OF POPULAR MATCHING
Note that a matching cannot be popular if at least one agent is unmatched. erefore throughout the paper we can focus only on full matchings, µ(A) ⊂ H .
Our rst main result characterizes the popular matching as a matching that is popular among each triple of agents.
For a pro le , we say that a matching µ is popular among each three agents if for each three agents a, b, c ∈ A there does not exist a matching µ ∈ M same as µ for each other agent a {a, b, c} µ (a ) = µ(a ) and such that it wins µ in pairwise comparison within this triple of agents
A matching is popular if and only if it is popular among each three agents.
P . e "only if" part is straightforward: each popular matching µ is popular among each triple of agents. For a contradiction, assume that there is a triple of agents a, b, c ∈ A and another matching µ same as µ for all other agents and such that it is preferred over µ: PC {a,b,c } (µ , µ) > PC {a,b,c } (µ, µ ). en µ cannot be popular among all agents since all other agents are indi erent and thus:
e "if" part we also prove by contradiction. For a contradiction, assume that there is a matching µ that is popular among each triple of agents, but it loses in pairwise comparison to some other matching µ : PC A (µ , µ) > PC A (µ, µ ). Consider all agents that have di erent houses in these two matchings, denote the set of these agents as A 1 = {a ∈ A : µ(a) µ (a)}. (In what follows we will change the notation of these agents for convenience).
We partition all agents into those who participate in a trading cycle, i.e. exchange their matched houses among themselves, and trading chains, i.e. those that are matched in µ to a previously empty house or whose house in µ becomes empty in µ .
We rst deal with chains. Consider an arbitrary agent b 1 ∈ A 1 that received a previously empty house µ (b 1 ) µ(A), µ(µ (b 1 )) = ∅. If b 1 's house is empty in µ , µ (µ(b 1 )) = ∅, then we get a chain of size 1. Otherwise there is some agent b 2 such that µ (b 2 ) = µ(b 1 ). If b 2 's house is empty in µ , µ (µ(b 2 )) = ∅, then we get a chain of size 2. Otherwise, we continue in the same way until we nd the last agent in the chain. Similarly, determine chains for each agent that receives a previously empty house. Denote the set of agents participating in a chain as B 1 .
We then deal with cycles. Consider an arbitrary agent not from any chain a 1 ∈ A 1 \ B 1 , µ(a 1 ) µ (a 1 ). Consider agent a 2 that owns house µ (a 1 ), a 2 = µ(µ (a 1 )). Agent a 2 also does not belong to any chain, a 1 ∈ A 1 \ B 1 and as µ(a 2 ) = µ (a 1 ), then a 2 a 1 . If the two agents just exchanged their houses, µ (a 2 ) = µ(a 1 ), then we get a trading cycle (µ(a 1 ), a 1 , µ (a 1 ), a 2 ) of length 2. Otherwise, if µ (a 2 ) µ(a 1 ), then consider agent a 3 = µ(µ (a 2 )). Since µ(a 3 ) = µ (a 2 ) µ(a 1 ), then a 2 a 3 , a 1 a 3 a 3 ∈ A 1 .
And so forth until we get a cycle of length at least 2 and at most |A 1 \ B 1 |. In the same way we nd all trading cycles among all other agents. us, the set A 1 and the set of corresponding houses µ(A 1 ) ∪ µ (A 1 ) is partitioned into trading chains of size at least 1 and cycles of size at least 2.
By assumption
, there is at least one trading chain or one trading cycle such that more than half of its agents prefer µ over µ. Formally, if A T C denotes the set of agents in this chain or cycle,
If A T C form a cycle, then we can nd two neighbouring agents i, j ∈ A T C , j = µ(µ (i)), that both prefer µ over µ. If this trading cycle is of length 2, then consider a new matching µ that is identical to µ for each agent except a = {i, j} and same as µ for these pair µ (a) = µ (a). en by adding one other arbitrary agent we get a triple of agents that prefer µ over µ by majority -contrary to our premise. If this trading cycle is of length more than 2, then consider the next neighbouring agent l = µ(µ (j)). Consider now a new matching µ that is identical to µ for each agent except a = {i, j, l } and µ (i) = µ (i), µ (j) = µ (j), and µ (l) = µ(i). e triple of agents i, j, l prefers µ over µ by majority: PC {i, j,l } (µ , µ) > PC {i, j,l } (µ, µ ), contrary to our premise.
If A T C forms a chain of length 1, A T C = {a 1 }, then consider a new matching µ constructed as before: µ is identical to µ for each agent except for a 1 , µ (a 1 ) = µ (a 1 ). A triple of agents a 1 and two arbitrary agents a 2 , a 3 prefers µ over the original matching µ: PC {a 1 ,a 2 ,a 3 } (µ , µ) > PC {a 1 ,a 2 ,a 3 } (µ, µ ), contrary to our premise.
If A T C forms a chain of length 2, then both agents in A T C are be er o in µ compared to µ. By adding one other arbitrary agent we get a triple of agents that prefers a similarly constructed µ over µ by majority, contrary to our premise.
If the length of the chain is above 2, then either (1) we can nd two neighbouring agents i, j ∈ A T C , j = µ(µ (i)), that both prefer µ over µ, or (2) the chain begins and ends with agents that are be er o in µ compared to µ (and agents in between interchange). In case (1) we take the triple of these agents i, j and the previous owner of j's house l = µ(µ (j)) (if j's house was empty, then take an arbitrary l). is triple i, j, l prefers a similarly constructed µ over µ by majority, contrary to our premise.
In case (2) we take the triple of agents as the rst agent in the chain a 1 , µ(µ (a 1 )) = ∅, the last agent a k , µ (µ(a k )) = ∅, and the one before the last a k −1 . e triple a 1 , a k−1 , a k prefers a similarly constructed µ over µ by majority, contrary to our premise.
As an immediate corollary we get the characterization of popular matchings from [Abraham et al., 2007] . C 3.2. A matching is popular if and only if (1) each agent gets either his rst house or his second house, and (2) each rst house is matched with one of its rst agents.
P
. e "if" part is straightforward since it is enough to check only triples of agents. In each such triple only an agent a with a second house can become be er o , but each be er house f a SH (a) is already matched to one of its rst agents b = µ(f ) ∈ FA(f ), making a be er o requires making b worse o , which cannot be supported by majority.
We prove the "only if" part by contradiction. Let condition (2) be violated: some rst house f is not allocated to one of its rst agents. en each f 's rst agent a ∈ FA(f ), the owner of f b = µ(f ) and the owner of b's rst house c = µ(F H (b)) form a triple for which µ is not popular.
Hence, in any popular matching, each agent gets his rst house, second house, or a bad house. Let condition (1) be violated: some agent a 1 gets a bad house t in matching µ, there is a triple of agents a 1 , the owner of a 1 's second house a 2 = µ(SH (a 1 )), and the owner of a 2 's rst house a 3 = µ(F H (a 2 )) for whom µ is not popular.
RANDOM PATHS TO POPULARITY
A popular market is a nite Markov chain. e set space is the set of matchings M. e transition probabilities between the states are not symmetric and depend on how many agents become be er o in one state compared to the other. For each matching µ ∈ M we consider all "neighbouring" matchings µ ∈ M that is matchings where at most three agents are matched to di erent house than in µ. If k = 1, 2, 3 agents are matched di erently in µ and µ , then we say that µ and µ are connected by a k-way exchange. If the k-way exchange makes more than half of these k agents be er o , then the transition probability is positive, otherwise the transition probability is zero.
en the set of absorbing states coincides with the set of popular matchings. Next we present our second main result. T 4.1. A popular market with groups of size up to 3 converges to a popular matching whenever it exists.
S
. According to the theory of Markov chains it is su cient to show that a popular matching -given it exists -can be reached in a nite number of allowed exchanges. We propose a simple nite algorithm that does it only by using one-,two-and three-way exchanges.
e algorithm has two stages. In the rst stage it matches each rst house to some of its rst agents. is is done in a greedy serial dictatorship fashion. According to a xed order each agent a takes his rst house f unless this house is already matched to one of its other rst agents (in this case no exchange takes place and we proceed to the next agent in the order). In the same time, the agent owning house f takes his own rst house and the owner of this house µ( ) takes the house of agent a. is three-way exchange is supported by at least two agents a and µ(f ), and, possibly, also by agent µ( ).
In the second stage of the algorithm we use another simple greedy procedure where owners of bad houses are forcibly given their second houses. Each agent a owning some bad house t takes his second house s, while the owner of s takes his rst house f , 6 and house t goes to the owner of f . is three-way exchange is supported by at least two agents a and µ(s), but the exchange also might be "bad" if t is a bad house for both agents µ(s) and µ(f ). A bad exchange like that leads to the same situation: out of three agents one owns his rst house, one owns his second house and one owns a bad house. It remains to show that the sequence of the bad exchanges is nite.
e niteness follows from that the sequence of bad exchanges eventually arrives to a house that was in the sequence earlier (due to niteness of A). At this step k of the sequence we have k − 2 agents that have the same
as their rst and second houses. By the Hall's theorem (applied to the characterization in Corollary 3.2) these houses can only be matched to these agents.
us agent k that gets house t a er a series of bad exchanges can only start a new sequence of bad exchanges but the other k − 1 agents remain untouched with their matched houses until the end of the algorithm. us the procedure converges to some matching and, by eorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, this matching is popular.
e restriction to the groups of three agents is not compulsory as the same algorithm works when groups of larger size are also allowed. C 4.2. A popular market with groups of arbitrary size converges to a popular matching whenever it exists. P T 4.1. e rst part of the algorithm. Let µ be the arbitrary initial matching where each agent is endowed with some house: for each a ∈ A µ(a) ∅. Let us x some ordering of agents A = {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
For steps k = 1, . . . , n we make the following exchanges. If in step k house µ(a k ) is the best house for agent a k , then proceed to step k + 1 without changing the current matching µ. Otherwise, consider house h µ(a k ) that is the best house of agent a k . If this house h is empty, µ(h) = ∅, then we give it to agent a k in the new matching µ (a k ) = h.
Otherwise, consider the owner of h, µ(h).
If h is the best for its owner µ(h), then proceed to the next step k + 1 without changing the current matching µ. Otherwise, consider the best house for agent µ(h): h h. If h = µ(a k ) or µ(h ) = ∅ then make the mutually bene cial two-way exchange: µ (a k ) = h, µ (µ(h)) = h . Otherwise, if µ(h ) {a k , µ(h), ∅} we make the three-way exchange:
is exchange is bene cial for at least two of the three agents. A er each of the above exchanges the number of agents that own their best houses goes up, and each agent gets his best house unless it is taken by some other agent. us a er x ≤ n exchanges we get a new matching µ where each agent gets either his rst house, his second house, or a bad house.
Denote the number of agents who get a bad house by β(µ). At least x ≥ 1 agents get their rst house, therefore β(µ) ≤ n − x ≤ n − 1. Note that n − β(µ) agents get either a rst house or a second house. e second part of the algorithm. We will make exchanges that weakly decrease the number of agents with a bad house β(µ). Consider some agent µ(t) that gets a bad house t. If his second house s is free, we give him s: µ (µ(t)) = s and decrease β(µ) by one. Otherwise there is some agent µ(s) that owns s, and s might be his bad house or his second house (but not his rst house from the de nition of second house). We now study these two cases.
1. Let s be a bad house for µ(s). Denote the second house of µ(s) as h. If h = t or empty, then make the two-way exchange decreasing β(µ) by 2. Otherwise, make the three-way exchange µ (µ(t)) = s, µ (µ(s)) = h, µ (µ(h)) = t, decreasing β(µ) by 1, 2 or 3 depending on how the owner of h ranks t. 2. Let s be the second house for µ(s). Let f be the rst house for agent µ(s). From the rst part of the algorithm we know that f is also the rst house of his owner µ(f ). Make the following three-way exchange: µ (µ(t)) = s, µ (µ(s)) = f , µ (µ(f )) = t. If t is the second house for agent µ(f ), then β(µ) decreases by one.
us β(µ) is only constant if house s is the second house for both µ(t) and µ(s), house f is the rst house for both µ(s) and µ(f ), and house t is a bad house for both agents µ(t) and µ(f ). Denote such exchange as bad. We show now that a sequence of these bad exchanges in which β(µ) remains constant is nite. Table 1 . Current matching µ before and a er a bad three-way exchange which keeps β(µ) a constant
2.1 Let f be the rst house also for agent µ(t). For convenience denote f = f 1 , s = s 1 , µ(t) = 1, µ(s) = 2, µ(f ) = 3. By Hall's theorem the second house for agent 3 cannot be the same as s 1 , s 3 s 1 (otherwise three agents have the same rst house and the same second house, and thus a popular matching does not exist). A er the bad exchange among agents 1,2,3 the bad house t is matched to agent 3. Consider another chain of three agents that starts with the bad house t. Denote µ(s 3 ) = 4. Note that f 4 f 1 (otherwise four agents have the same rst house, two of them have the same second house, and the other two of them also have the same second house, and thus a popular matching does not exist). Denote µ(f 4 ) = 5. By Hall's theorem s 5 {s 1 , s 3 } (otherwise, similar to the previous arguments the popular matching does not exist). A er the bad exchange between agents 3,4,5 the bad house is matched with agent 5, and so forth. In each such bad exchange two new agents enter the chain, these agents own their rst and second houses. en, we need not more than (n + 2 − β(µ))/2 bad exchanges to reduce β(µ).
2.2 Let the rst house f 1 for agent µ(t) be di erent from house f . Denote f = f 2 , s = s 1 , µ(t) = 1, µ(s) = 2, µ(f ) = 3. A er one bad exchange agent 3 would be matched to house t.
Assume that the second house for agent 3 s 3 s 1 -we did not meet s 3 earlier in the chain. 7 Consider agent 4 that owns his second house s 3 . Assume that agent 4's rst house f 4 was note previously in the chain: f 4 f 1 , f 2 . 8 Consider the next agent 5 and so on: we get a chain of agents such that each two neighbours have either the same rst house or the same second house. Eventually we arrive to some agent k that has the same rst or second house as earlier in the chain.
Let agent k be the rst agent in the chain such that his rst house is f 1 . en a er (k mod 2) exchanges he gets f 1 and each other agent among 1, . . . , k receives either his second or rst house and, by Hall's theorem, for this pro le this is the unique possibility in each popular matching. Now let agent k be the rst agent in the chain such that his rst house has already appeared in the chain (twice -since two neighbouring agents have the same rst house) and is di erent from f 1 . Initially he owns his second house µ(k) = s k , and a er (k mod 2) he gets his rst house and starts a series of bad exchanges along the same chain but in the opposite direction. Each agent that received his second house in the rst series of exchanges now gets his rst house, and vice versa.
us agent 1 that started the chain now gets his rst house f 1 (and house t is matched to µ(f 1 )). Each agent among 1, . . . , k receives either his second or rst house and, by Hall's theorem, this is the unique possibility in each popular matching.
Similarly, let agent k be the rst agent in the chain such that his second house has already appeared in the chain. en a er (k mod 2) bad exchanges in one direction or agent k gets the bad house t and then again reverses the direction of bad exchanges such that agent 1 gets house f 1 , which happens a er less than k exchanges.
Eventually, a er at most k exchanges we decrease β(µ). In each bad exchange we have one agent with a bad house, others have a rst or a second house. In the worst case all agents have a bad house, and each agents that gets his rst or his second house participates in each subsequent chain.
us for the rst agent with a bad house (β = n) we get 1 exchange, for the second agent with a bad house (β = n − 1) we get 1 exchange, for the third agent with a bad house (β = n − 2 we get 2 exchanges, and so forth. erefore, the upper bound is 1 + 1 + 2 + ... + (n − 1) = (n 2 − n + 2)/2.
CONCLUSIONS
In the current paper we propose a novel characterization of "global" popularity via "local" popularity, and also show that locally popular exchanges lead to a globally popular matching.
One important open question is about the convergence speed of popular markets. To answer this question one may need to design a more e cient algorithm: our greedy algorithm does many unnecessary steps, for instance when it repeatedly runs the same chains. We cannot simply avoid these steps as then we cannot build a triple that blocks the current matching. However, it might be possible if we use alternative algorithms.
Another open question is about popular markets in situations when popular matchings do not exist. Perhaps, these markets converge to some stationary probabilistic distribution over the set of matchings, and it is reasonable to deem the more probable matchings as more popular. Both questions are interesting but hard. 7 If house s 3 -was earlier in the chain (i.e. if s 3 = s 1 ), then we do not need to implement the bad exchange since by Hall's theorem in any popular matching houses f 2 , s 1 must be matched to agents 2,3. In this case in any popular matching agent 1 cannot get his second house and has to get his rst house. Yet, if we implement the rst bad exchange and t is matched to agent 3, the next bad exchange matches s 1 to agent 3 and f 1 to agent 1, which is exactly what is prescribed by the Hall's theorem. 8 Speci cally, if f 4 = f 1 then by Hall's theorem in any popular matching agents 1,2,3,4 share houses f 1 , f 2 , s 1 , s 3 and we need two bad exchanges to do that. If f 4 = f 2 , then by Hall's theorem in each popular matching agents 3,4 are matched to f 2 , s 3 , thus agent 2 is matched to s 1 and agent 1 is matched to f 1 . is is exactly what we get a er three bad exchanges.
